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Iraq as a Psychological Quagmire: The
Implications of Using Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder as a Defense for Iraq
War Veterans
Erin M. Gover*
Of the approximately 1.5 million troops' expected to be dis-
charged from the armed forces after serving in Iraq and Afghan-
istan, up to 20 percent 2 (or 300,000) could be afflicted with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). That number could rise,
as was the experience of the Vietnam veterans: as of 1988, 70
percent of Vietnam veterans were diagnosed with PTSD.3
Translated into real numbers, 70 percent of troops would equal
1,050,000 Iraq war4 veterans that developed PTSD. Further-
more, "[r]esearchers also have found that 25% of the soldiers
who participated in and survived heavy combat [in Vietnam]
have since been charged with a criminal offense."5 This statistic
could mean up to 375,000 new cases for our court systems, all
claiming Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a defense, but not
all able to receive appropriate punishments for their disorder.
* J.D. candidate 2008, Pace University School of Law; B.A. Political Science
and International Relations, magna cum laude, 2005, Syracuse University. The
author would like to thank her friends and family for their undying encourage-
ment and support through law school and beyond.
1. VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS COMMISSION, HONORING THE CALL TO DuTY:
VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 383 (Oct. 2007) http://wwwl.
va.gov/advisory/docs/ReportDisabilityBenefitsCommission9-27-97.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2008).
2. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for PTSD, Fact
Sheet, How Common is PTSD? http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/factshts/
fshowcommon isptsd.html?opm=l&rr=rr1363&srt=d&echorr=true (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008).
3. Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controver-
sial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 415
(1988).
4. The author realizes that Operation Iraqi Freedom has not been classified as
a war, but is part of the Global War on Terror. The conflict will thus hereinafter be
designated as the "Iraq war."
5. Ann R. Auberry, PTSD: Effective Representation of a Vietnam Veteran in
the Criminal Justice System, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 647, 650 (1985).
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This is because of the vast differences in punishments for ex-
isting criminal defenses that PTSD can prove. This problem
needs to be addressed before approximately 375,000 veterans
are either jailed or institutionalized without the proper treat-
ment for their disorder.
PTSD has been used to prove existing criminal law de-
fenses since 1978.6 Its use as a defense rose dramatically when
the American Psychiatric Association officially recognized it as
a mental disorder 7 in 1980.8 Depending on the jurisdiction,
PTSD can be used to prove a defense of insanity, diminished
capacity, unconsciousness/automatism, or self defense and can
also be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing proceedings. 9
If a PTSD defense is successfully used to prove insanity, the
veteran will be committed to a mental health institution.10 A
successful unconsciousness defense will result in a complete ac-
quittal," as will diminished capacity in some jurisdictions. 2
Thus, the wide variety of plausible defenses available to a vet-
eran suffering from PTSD exists, but none of the defenses listed
above can fully address the symptoms and results of PTSD. The
unconsciousness defense only applies to those who experience
6. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The "Vietnam Syndrome" Defense: A "G.1. Bill of
Criminal Rights"?, 1985 ARMY LAW. 1, 27 (1985).
[John R.1 Coughlin's flashback in May 1978 [where he assaulted a Quincy,
MA police station with a sawed-off shotgun, screaming, 'The gooks are eve-
rywhere .... Kill them!'] was apparently the first time PSTD had been
brought to the attention of the general public as a legal issue, although in-
sanity had previously been used as a defense by Vietnam veterans.
Id.
7. C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-Traumatic Stress Dis-
order and Criminal Behavior, 25 B.C. L. REV. 305, 317 (1984) (Stating, "[o]nce
PTSD was recognized as a disorder that could be isolated and diagnosed by psychi-
atrists and psychologists, it became a legitimate issue to be raised in legal proceed-
ings. After the publication of DSM III, therefore, PTSD was raised in several cases
as an explanation for a defendant's criminal conduct.").
8. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 236-39 (1980).
9. See generally Ann R. Auberry, Comment, PTSD: Effective Representation of
a Vietnam Veteran in the Criminal Justice System, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 647 (1985).
10. Id. at 665 (noting that "[iun many jurisdictions an acquittal based upon an
insanity defense creates a situation of automatic commitment to a mental
institution").
11. Id. at 668-69.
12. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 721 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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dissociative states. 13 Insanity results in committal to a mental
institution which may not be the best treatment. When PTSD
is used only as a mitigating factor, a PTSD veteran is sent to
prison where the veteran's symptoms may be exacerbated by
being locked up in a cell alone. Veterans suffering from PTSD
who commit crimes deserve to be punished only to the extent
that they are culpable for their actions. It is because of the
unique nature of PTSD that veterans need a defense that ad-
dresses the symptoms and provides appropriate treatment.
Furthermore, the cultural conditions of the United States
exacerbate the problems with the PTSD defense in its current
state. The disorder itself spawned several similar defenses,
such as Holocaust Syndrome, Battered Child's Syndrome, Black
Rage and Love Fear Syndrome.14 The proliferation of PTSD
made the disorder a household phrase. 15 Thus, it is likely that
many Iraq veterans have gone into combat knowing about the
PTSD defense. This, when coupled with the fact that the symp-
toms are easily falsified,' 6 may attribute to an increase in ac-
quittals based on fraudulent PTSD defenses. Given this
problem, there remains the need to create a PTSD defense so
that the goals of punishment 7 are served, while the plight of
veterans genuinely plagued by PTSD is recognized and treated
appropriately. The goal of this comment is to draw attention to
this issue and propose a prototype defense that may prevent
Iraq from becoming a psychological quagmire.
I. What is Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder?
"The most common difficulty people have is fitting into civil-
ian life. You'll never be an average citizen again."'8
13. Elizabeth J. Delgado, Vietnam Stress Syndrome and the Criminal Defen-
dant, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 473, 484 (1986).
14. Ralph Slovenko, The Watering Down of PTSD in Criminal Law, J. OF PSY-
CHIATRY & L., Fall 2004, at 421.
15. Id. at 419.
16. Id. at 415.
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (1962) (Stating that "the general purposes of
the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders are: (a) to pre-
vent the commission of offenses; (b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of
offenders; (c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbi-
trary punishment ... ").
18. Kevin Sajdak, Soldier Under Stress, THE DAILY ORANGE, Nov. 1, 2006,
available at http://www.dailyorange.com/home/index.cfm?event=displayArticle&
563
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
War veterans are among the prime candidates for PTSD be-
cause of the causes of the disorder. PTSD may develop after one
experiences a life-threatening or highly traumatic event, such
as military combat, rape, abuse (sexual or physical), or terrorist
attacks.19 When an individual experiences such an event, the
body produces a stress response which begins in the reticular
activating system and continues to the hypothalamus. 20 The
hypothalamus signals the pituitary gland to secrete the adreno-
corticotropic hormone ("ACTH") which eventually causes the
production of adrenaline. 21 The adrenaline causes the stress re-
sponse of rapid heartbeat, pain desensitizing and hyper-alert-
ness.22 The brain then terminates the stress response when
needed in a negative feedback process where more ACTH is re-
leased in order to stop the ACTH production. 23 The problem in
persons with PTSD is that they experience a stress response
every time there is a reminder of the stressor (i.e. a flashback,
triggering image or related incident). The person is, thus,
under continuous stress, which can have a "deleterious effect on
the brain."24
There are many symptoms that result from being under
continuous stress. They can include dissociation (flashbacks),
exaggerated startle response, irritability and impulsive behav-
ior.25 The American Psychiatric Association lists the diagnostic
criteria for PTSD in the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders as follows:
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or
more) of the following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event,
including images, thoughts, or perceptions ....
uStory jd=69eb9005-6dd3-4f3f-ae70-eeflfc076faa (last visited Mar. 28, 2008)
(quoting Ben Tupper, an Operation Enduring Freedom soldier).
19. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, National Center for PTSD, What is
PTSD?, http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact-shts/fs-what-is-ptsd.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
20. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Sci-
ence and Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 9, 18 (2001).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Delgado, supra note 13, at 476.
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(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event ....
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (in-
cludes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations,
and dissociative flashback episodes, includes those that occur on
awakening or when intoxicated) ....
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or exter-
nal cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic
event.
(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma
and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the
trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated
with the trauma
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recol-
lections of the trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant
activities
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a
career, marriage, children, or a normal life span)
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before
trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger
(3) difficulty concentrating
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D)
is more than 1 month.
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impair-
ment of social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning. 26
Using the above criteria in diagnosing patients, the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association concluded that eight percent of the
American population suffers from PTSD that will have lifetime
prevalence, with the highest rates among those who have
26. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 468 (4th ed. 2000).
565
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served in military combat. 27 With at least 1.5 million American
troops returning from Iraq,28 that percentage will increase.
Other factors can increase the probability of acquiring
PTSD. Indicators such as family history, severity of the stres-
sor, proximity to the event, childhood experiences and preexist-
ing mental conditions can increase the likelihood of developing
PTSD when exposed to trauma and exacerbate its severity.29
Existing evidence also suggests that PTSD can be inherited. 30
However, "[this disorder can develop in individuals without
any predisposing conditions, particularly if the stressor is espe-
cially extreme."31 In short, there is no profile of a person who
can develop PTSD. A person exposed to trauma can be subject
to its debilitating symptoms and another person may not be.
Researchers are working to discover more about the causes and
treatments of this disorder.32
With regards to military personnel, new and varied U.S.
military missions have an impact on a soldier's psyche. In par-
ticular, the "diversity in the nature and character of the mis-
sions"33 created a vast difference in combat experiences for
veterans. 34 Because of this, evaluators of PTSD developed new
assessment instruments that "account for the changing nature
of the mission"35 (i.e. changing from a peacekeeping mission to a
combat mission or changing from a mission to remove a dictator
to a defense mission). Evaluators now take into consideration
the environment, the person's emotional responses, what type
of military activities they participated in and the dimensions of
the mission itself.36 The dimensions of the mission will help de-
termine which stressors may be present.
As applied to a veteran suffering from PTSD who has com-
mitted a crime, veterans tend to engage in crime because of the
27. Id. at 466.
28. VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS COMMISSION, supra note 1.
29. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 26, at 466.
30. Id. at 466-67.
31. Id. at 466.
32. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 19.
33. ASSESSING PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA AND PTSD, 278 (John P. Wilson & Ter-
ence M. Keane, eds., 1997).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id.
[Vol. 28:561
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survival mode derived from combat. According to John P. Wil-
son and Sheldon D. Zigelbaum in their 1983 study of 114 Viet-
nam veterans, this survival instinct manifests itself in three
modes: the dissociative reaction, the sensation seeking syn-
drome and the depression-suicide syndrome.37 The most preva-
lent symptom is dissociation; this symptom causes the person to
believe that they are in combat and respond to perceived stres-
sors with violence as they would in combat. 38 Because of this
survivor-mode reaction, PTSD is commonly associated with vio-
lent criminal behavior. 39
However, PTSD can also be associated with non-violent
criminal activities because of a second way in which this sur-
vival-mode instinct affects veterans: sensation seeking syn-
drome. 40 The syndrome causes veterans to engage in dangerous
and thrilling behavior in order to maintain control over the
traumatic imagery they are experiencing. "[Ilt performs a de-
fensive function since the sensation seeking syndrome is a com-
plex form of repetition compulsion which blocks the onset of
intrusive experiences."'41 If the veteran does not fulfill this urge,
he begins to suffer the extreme symptoms of PTSD. 42
Finally, the survivor-mode may cause the veteran to experi-
ence the depression-suicide syndrome. Here, the veteran is
plagued by depression, guilt that he survived and his fellow
troop members did not, and a sense that he was a mere pawn
used by the government.43 Because of these rampant feelings of
self-loathing and depression, the veteran may seek to take his
own life as a way to end the terrible imagery he or she is exper-
iencing or to join his or her departed brethren. 44 "Such a sui-
cidal wish may then give rise to criminal action if the veteran
unconsciously acts out his anger at the government or other au-
thority figures symbolically equivalent."45 Considering the cur-
37. John P. Wilson & Sheldon D. Zigelbaum, The Vietnam Veteran on Trial:
The Relation of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Criminal Behavior, 1 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 69, 73-76 (1983).
38. Id. at 73.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 74.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 75.
44. Id.
45. Id.
567
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rent opposition to the conflict in Iraq, this syndrome may be the
most prevalent among those veterans returning from a tour of
duty in Iraq.
Thus, PTSD may reveal itself in many forms, all equally
debilitating and all equally dangerous. However, knowledge of
the disorder and its symptoms may provide the veteran an ap-
propriate defense in a criminal prosecution.
II. Proving PTSD
It can be argued that the true difficulty for attorneys in
PTSD defense cases is the manner in which the disorder is
proven. 46 In an interview with C. Peter Erlinder, Professor of
Law at William Mitchell College of Law, he states that the suc-
cess of a PTSD case depends on the method of proof.47 As
mental state is always an issue in any criminal case, proof of
PTSD should demonstrate that the actor was less culpable or
not culpable. 48 To show this, attorneys must prove PTSD factu-
ally, using detailed exhibits and testimony that describe the
trauma incurred. For a war veteran, this would include testi-
mony from members of the defendant's military unit present at
the time of the trauma, testimony from military commanders
detailing the mission itself, military records and lay testimony
concerning the defendant's behavior before and after the tour of
duty.49 The facts proven would then apply towards one of the
defenses applicable to mental state (insanity, diminished capac-
ity, self-defense, etc.). PTSD is the one psychological disorder
that can be proven absolutely, because it stems from an identifi-
able trauma and the evidence of that trauma is discernable. 50
Therefore, if proven, a PTSD defense has the potential to be
successful regardless of the defense used.51
Professor Erlinder describes PTSD in terms of an analogy
to a civil personal injury case. 52 He states that where there was
46. Telephone Interview with C. Peter Erlinder, Professor of Law, William
Mitchell College of Law, in St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 10, 2006).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
568 [Vol. 28:561
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a car accident and the injured plaintiff sues the driver of the
other car, the lawyer would not just offer evidence of the plain-
tiffs injuries without proving that an accident occurred.53 The
same is true of PTSD. The lawyer representing a PTSD defen-
dant should not be offering evidence of his client's PTSD symp-
toms without first proving the trauma that caused the
disorder. 54 The problem is that this is the way lawyers have
typically argued PTSD cases. They use expert psychiatrists
who testify that the defendant has PTSD but who do not bother
to investigate the trauma itself.55 It is virtually guaranteed
that the expert psychiatrist also failed to investigate the
trauma independently. 56 Thus, the "tendency is to just throw
psychological testimony at the jury and see what sticks."57 This
method is wrong, and when it is done, Professor Erlinder states
that the PTSD defense should fail. 58 If PTSD is not presented
in the way a personal injury case is proven, it is not a PTSD
defense. 59
However, it can also be argued that even if PTSD is proven
in the manner described by Erlinder, the inadequacies in the
legal standards and defenses still pose a barrier to PTSD de-
fense success. The trauma suffered by a war veteran may be
admissible, but it is ultimately up to the fact finder to deter-
mine if that trauma sufficiently qualifies for an insanity de-
fense, diminished capacity, self-defense, unconsciousness and
so on. The trauma qualifies if it affects the mental state to the
extent prescribed by statute in order to negate mens rea. A vet-
eran may well have suffered trauma, but a judge or jury may
not see it as enough to cause the symptoms purported, and thus
affect the mens rea to the extent necessary to reduce culpabil-
ity. A defense designed to encompass the symptoms of PTSD
specifically may solve this issue for the predicted Iraq war vet-
eran cases.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
569
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III. Iraq vs. Vietnam
The Vietnam experience and Operation Iraqi Freedom are
quite similar, thus indicating that the crime rates of Vietnam
veterans may repeat themselves in Iraq veterans.60 In both con-
flicts, troops were sent off to combat, backed by patriotism and
the want of victory. They returned, however, to animosity to-
wards an immoral war and a public demand for withdrawal.
The public mood after Vietnam and currently in regards to Iraq
is embittered, untrusting and scornful. Iraq veterans are com-
ing back to a public who may value their work in general, but
disagrees with their cause. In the case of Vietnam, this worked
to create higher rates of PTSD61 and higher crime rates among
those veterans with PTSD. The same predication can be made
for Iraq.
IV. PTSD and its Use as a Defense
A. The Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is the most common strategy for
presenting PTSD as a defense. The insanity defense itself can
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but most use some form of
the M'Naghten standard. 62  The standard came from
M'Naghten's Case, an 1843 English case where M'Naghten (the
defendant) intended to murder the Prime Minister but instead
shot his secretary. 63 The jury acquitted M'Naghten on the
ground of insanity.64 Outraged by the verdict, the House of
Lords, in response to the M'Naghten acquittal, created a new
legal test for insanity and criminality in general:65
'The jurors ought to be told ... that to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the na-
60. Michael J. Davidson, supra note 3, at 416-18.
61. Id.
62. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2720-22 (2006).
63. Geraldine L. Brotherton, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder-Opening Pan-
dora's Box?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 91, 104 (1982).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 104-05.
570 [Vol. 28:561
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ture and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.'66
The M'Naghten test is the strictest of all insanity defenses
and requires that a defendant not know right from wrong.67
"For all practical purposes, a defendant must be almost totally
and irrevocably deranged in order to be acquitted under the
M'Naghten test; this is a result of the rigid formulation of the
rule."68 For example, in the case of State v. Felde,69 defendant
Robert Felde, a Vietnam veteran, escaped from prison where he
was serving time for a Maryland manslaughter and assault con-
viction.70 Felde was subsequently arrested as a simple drunk.71
While in the back of the police cruiser, Felde was leaning too far
into the front seat.72 The officer pushed him back and a shot
was fired with three following it.73 The officer was killed and
Felde was charged with first degree murder.74 Felde claimed
that he didn't remember anything after the first shot and at
trial pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.75
Several psychiatrists examined Felde and determined that
he was suffering from PTSD.76 Dr. John P. Wilson testified that
the recent loss of Felde's mother, coupled with the news that
police were looking for him, triggered a helpless feeling. 77 Felde
bought a gun as a "form of security against an impending
threat."78 In Wilson's opinion, Felde satisfied the M'Naghten
test adopted by Louisiana because Felde could not discern right
from wrong and was unable to abide by the law.79 However, the
jury decided otherwise and did not believe that the evidence,
including lay testimony on how Felde had changed since re-
66. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (citing M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (H.L.)).
67. Davidson, supra note 3, at 424.
68. Brotherton, supra note 63, at 109.
69. State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
70. Id. at 375.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 376.
76. Id. at 376-79.
77. Id. at 378.
78. Id.
79. Id.
11
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turning from Vietnam,80 supported a finding of insanity.8'
Felde was sentenced to death upon his own request: "All I can
say to you all is... I would advise you to return the death pen-
alty in this case .... "82 When asked by a juror whether he
believed that he would be able to control his actions in the fu-
ture if the death penalty were not returned, Felde replied, "I
think other deaths will result."8 3 In Felde's closing argument,
he also stated, "A walking time bomb, that's what it is. Some-
body else will die as a result of it if I'm not put to death, I am
sure .... I think, as my countrymen, you owe me that much. I
did my part. Please do yours."8 4 Thus, Felde exemplifies why a
defense specifically designed for PTSD sufferers is needed: we
need to prevent those "walking time bombs."
In contrast to Felde, the insanity defense succeeded in State
v. Heads.8 5 The defendant, another Vietnam veteran, was
charged with murder for killing his sister-in-law's husband.8 6
After receiving a new trial, Heads raised a PTSD defense. Tes-
timony relating to Heads' PTSD tended to establish that:
After returning from Vietnam, he had experienced at least one
'dissociative state' in which he reverted to combat-type behavior;
the Vietnam-like physical conditions at the scene of the shooting
which, together with the emotional threat of losing his wife and
family, combined to cause a reaction in which Mr. Heads 'was on
automatic'; and that after the shooting Mr. Heads was quietly ar-
rested at the scene, still holding his weapon.87
The jury subsequently found Heads not guilty by reason of
insanity under Louisiana's M'Naghten test.88
Other cases have had similar verdicts. In New Jersey v.
Cocuzza,8 9 the defendant, a Vietnam veteran, assaulted police
80. Id. at 376.
81. Id. at 375.
82. Id. at 394.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and Criminal Behavior, 25 B. C. L. REV. 305, 319 (1984) (citing State v.
Heads, No 106, 126 (First Jud. Dist. Ct. Caddo Parish, La. Oct. 10, 1981)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 321.
88. Id.
89. New Jersey v. Cocuzza, No. 1484-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981).
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officers in a park with a log.90 He was carrying the log like a
rifle and believed that the officers following him were enemy
soldiers.91 He claimed insanity based on PTSD and was found
not guilty by reason of insanity under New Jersey's version of
the M'Naghten test.92
The federal courts use a test based on M'Naghten as well.
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 198493 is an even stricter
"right-wrong" test. It states:
(a) Affirmative Defense-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecu-
tion under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission
of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the na-
ture and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of Proof-The defendant has the burden of proving the
defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. 94
The federal test requires that a defendant prove that he is
afflicted with a severe mental defect, making it more rigid than
M'Naghten and therefore more difficult to prove. Thus, the
higher the level of proof required, the less likely a veteran suf-
fering from PTSD will be able to meet the standards for an in-
sanity defense.
This is the inherent problem of both the M'Naghten test
and the Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act. The rigidity cre-
ates a defense only for a specific group of PTSD sufferers: those
who suffer from dissociative states.
If [a person's] crime were one of violence, such as murder or as-
sault, and he indeed believed that he was in combat in Vietnam,
then it could reasonably be concluded that he did not know his
actions were wrong as he believed he was attacked or killing the
enemy. If, however, he suffered from the myriad of other symp-
toms ... the M'Naghten test would provide him no defense.95
90. Menefee, supra note 6, at 15 (citing New Jersey v. Cocuzza, No. 1484-79
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1981)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
94. Id.
95. Delgado, supra note 13, at 483.
573
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However, the "other symptoms" can serve to negate mens
rea, just as a dissociative state can, by reducing an individual's
culpability. Those veterans suffering from the sensation seek-
ing syndrome, the depression-suicide syndrome, or those who
"snap" due to irritability have reduced culpability because
PTSD has impaired their mental state. Thus, criminal liability
should be imposed in those circumstances and an insanity de-
fense should be appropriate. Under the M'Naghten test, Iraq
War veterans will rarely be able to pose a successful insanity
defense.
In contrast to the M'Naghten rule, the American Law Insti-
tute ("ALI"), in the Model Penal Code, created another version
of the insanity test, one with a volitional component. It reads:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
or otherwise antisocial conduct.96
The ALI approach presents a volitional component by ad-
dressing a defendant's ability to conform his or her conduct to
the necessities of the law. The volitional component of the ALI
test allows it to be less rigid than the strict "right-wrong" two-
component M'Naghten test. "Because the ALI test includes
[this] volitional prong, the veteran who is unable to control his
actions as a result of PTSD would be able to assert an insanity
defense, even though he knows what he is doing and that it is
wrong."97 The ALI test would thus cover a PTSD sufferer with
dissociative state and/or impulsive or aggressive symptoms.
The ALI approach was successful in State v. Wood, 98 where
the defendant, a Vietnam veteran, "claimed that the physical
similarities of his factory workplace and his artillery base in Vi-
etnam initiated a flashback that culminated in the shooting of
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
97. Delgado, supra note 13, at 483.
98. Davidson, supra note 3, at 426 (citing State v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Ill.
1982)).
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his foreman."99 Defendant Wood was found not guilty by reason
of insanity under the ALI standard. 100
However, the ALI approach does not cover all symptoms of
veterans with PTSD. The volitional component only addresses
the symptom of impulsiveness. This results in a disservice to
those veterans who have a legitimate PTSD defense but do not
have dissociative states or impulsive symptoms.
The M'Naghten test and the Model Penal Code (ALI) test do
not create a sufficient defense for addressing the needs of PTSD
veterans. The less commonly used tests, such as the Irresistible
Impulse test,101 also do not fit symptoms of PTSD. The Irresisti-
ble Impulse test "extends the insanity defense to situations
where the defendant was incapable, by reason of mental disease
or defect, of controlling his conduct.' 102 This is merely the voli-
tional component of the ALI test and would not include those
who suffered from such symptoms as irritability, sensation-
seeking syndrome, or depression.
Many PTSD veterans attempt to prove an insanity defense;
however, it is rarely successful and usually only for those suffer-
ing from dissociative state symptoms. Depending on the type of
insanity test (M'Naghten, ALI or Irresistible Impulse), a voli-
tional component may work to get other symptoms, such as im-
pulsion and aggression, past the insanity defense velvet rope.
Even where the insanity defense is successful, it is difficult to
gather statistical evidence to prove it. "If the defendant is ac-
quitted, there is no appeal, and the dispositions in state trial
courts (unlike federal trial courts) are essentially beyond
study."0 3 Thus, the insanity defense does not seem to be the
most viable option for those planning to use PTSD in an excul-
patory manner.
B. Diminished Capacity
The diminished capacity defense is a variation of the in-
sanity test in that it negates the mens rea required for the com-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Delgado, supra note 13, at 473 n.3.
102. Id.
103. Slovenko, supra note 14, at 431 n.7.
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mission of the offense charged. 10 4 It negates specific intent.10 5
When a defendant asserts a diminished capacity defense, he as-
serts that, due to mental incapacity, he or she could not form
the requisite intent for the charge. The defense is likely to have
an increased rate of success in PTSD cases 106 because it deals
only with mental capacity and not the ability to discern right
from wrong; however, it is only available in a limited number of
jurisdictions. 0 7 It has even been abolished in jurisdictions that
had previously adopted the defense. 08 Thus, the diminished ca-
pacity defense only has the power to reach a select few veterans
choosing to use PTSD as an exculpatory device. It is yet an-
other example of why a defense specifically designed for PTSD
sufferers needs to be created.
When successful, the diminished capacity defense will re-
sult in a complete acquittal in federal courts. 10 9 In United
States v. Fishman,"0 defendant Fishman was charged with
eleven counts of mail fraud; Fishman sought to assert both the
insanity defense and a diminished capacity defense in the event
that the insanity defense was not successful."' The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California dis-
tinguished the diminished capacity defense from the insanity
defense by stating that involuntary committal will not occur
with diminished capacity. 1 2 Instead, a defendant will be ac-
quitted. 13 Furthermore, the court noted the differences with
respect to expert testimony." 4 The Insanity Defense Reform
Act limits expert testimony to the defendant's mental disease or
defect, 15 whereas the diminished capacity defense allows "psy-
chiatric testimony that goes beyond the defendant's cognitive
defects" 116 to negate specific intent. When applied to a PTSD
104. 21 Am. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 38 (2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Delgado, supra note 13, at 474 n.6.
109. United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 721 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 715.
112. Id. at 721.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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sufferer, this difference allows expert testimony to comment on
the various symptoms of PTSD and relate testimony to the
changes in defendant's behavior and lifestyle pre- and post-
Iraq. Thus, the big picture of PTSD reveals itself when using
the diminished capacity defense.
However, in some jurisdictions, the diminished capacity de-
fense may only qualify as a partial defense. 117 In State v.
Brink,118 Minnesota declared that the diminished capacity and
responsibility defenses are "considered 'partial defenses' be-
cause they do not completely exonerate the defendant but
merely reduce the degree or nature of the crime."1 9 In Penn-
sylvania, the court in Commonwealth v. Paolello120 declared
that the diminished capacity defense may only be used when
the defendant admits criminal liability but contests the degree
of guilt.121 This results in PTSD being used to downgrade a
criminal offense and not acquitting the defendant of said
offense.122
Thus, the problem with diminished capacity is its infre-
quent use and its varied effect when the defense is used. Al-
though appropriate for PTSD veterans because it focuses on the
mental capacity to form intent, diminished capacity is suffering
from its own disjunctive disorder and is not applicable to many
veterans.
C. Unconsciousness/Automatism
Unlike diminished capacity, the defense of unconscious-
ness, also known as automatism, is uniform in nature. The
ALI's Model Penal Code defines the defense as:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based
on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to per-
form an act of which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of
this Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
117. State v. Brink, 500 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Commonwealth v. Paolello, 665 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1995).
121. Id. at 78.
122. Id.
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(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort
or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual .... 123
In short, a person has to voluntarily commit a criminal act
in order to be guilty. When a person is unconscious, he or she is
not capable of committing a voluntary act.
As applied to PTSD, those in a dissociative state are in a
state of unconsciousness. 124 In a combat setting, this is caused
by the group bonding of the units. 125 Where there is loss to a
group, the group responds, as directed, with violence. 126 The
mantra becomes violence first, think later. 27 This creates a sit-
uation where loss becomes a learned behavior that is auto-
matic. 2 8 When the veteran subsequently experiences loss, he
or she reacts as he or she was trained: with violence. 29 It is an
automatic and involuntary response. When successful, the un-
consciousness/automatism defense will result in a complete ac-
quittal because it negates the actus reus in the crime. 30
When actus reus is negated, the defendant is not commit-
ted to a mental institution. This is because the unconsciousness
defense is not necessarily rooted in mental illness.13' By assert-
ing the unconsciousness defense, "the defendant avoids both the
stigma of an insanity defense and confinement in a mental in-
stitution."132 The PTSD defendant would thus escape any crim-
inal record or punishment.
However, this defense also poses the problem outlined in
the insanity defense: it is limited to those who experience disso-
ciative states as a PTSD symptom. 33 "In order for the defen-
dant to have been legally unconscious in a PTSD context, he
would have to have been in a fugue or dissociative state." 34 In
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962).
124. Delgado, supra note 13, at 484-85.
125. Telephone Interview with C. Peter Erlinder, supra note 46.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Delgado, supra note 13, at 484-85.
131. Erlinder, supra note 85, at 329.
132. Delgado, supra note 13, at 484.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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People v. Lisnow, 135 the defendant was in a restaurant and,
without any provocation, struck the maitre d' twice. 136 Lisnow
then went into the parking lot where he assaulted others until
he was subdued and arrested. 37 Lisnow testified that he could
not remember any of these events and said that he had exper-
ienced such black-outs and other "dream-like" experiences since
his return from Vietnam where he had been engaged in a
lengthy tour of duty and heavy combat. 38 A psychiatrist at his
trial testified that Lisnow's lapse of memory was due to a loss of
consciousness during the incident brought on by a fugue or dis-
sociative state, symptoms of PTSD. 39 Lisnow's conviction was
overturned on appeal because of his unconsciousness defense. 40
Thus, an unconsciousness defense is only available to those who
experience dissociative flashbacks as a symptom of PTSD.
D. Mitigating Factor
PTSD used as a mitigating factor during the sentencing
phase of a criminal proceeding, while successful, still usually
results in imprisonment. In this context, PTSD works to down-
grade the offense so as to result in a lesser punishment. This is
evidenced in the most recent case of State v. Denni'4' where the
defendant, an Iraq war veteran, was charged with the first de-
gree murder of his wife. 142 Denni confessed to killing her, 43 ex-
plaining that after she had approached him in their bedroom
and announced that she was leaving him for another man, he
pulled out his 9 millimeter handgun and shot her once in the
neck.144 Denni claimed that he just "snapped" and had never
thought about killing his wife.145 At trial, Denni testified that
he had been suffering from PTSD since returning from Iraq and
135. People v. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App. 3d 21 (1978).
136. Id. at 23.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. State v. Denni, No. 33153-5-II, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 977 (Wash. Ct.
App. May 16, 2006).
142. Id. at *1.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Michael Rosenwald, The Iraq Defense: Can Lawyers Make the Case for
PTSD?, ESQUIRE, Oct. 2006, at 74.
145. Denni, 2006 Wash App. LEXIS 977, at *4.
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that his mental health had worsened when his wife informed
him that she had been having an affair. 146 Denni was subse-
quently convicted of second degree murder, with a firearm en-
hancement, because the jury believed his PTSD defense. 147
Thus, this case and another just like it148 demonstrate that a
jury is more likely to mitigate a charge when PTSD is asserted.
Of course, PTSD is also applicable when downgrading a
murder charge to manslaughter. The ALI has recognized this
possibility in their Model Penal Code:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
it is committed recklessly; or
a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasona-
bleness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the cir-
cumstances as he believes them to be .... 149
Most states have adopted the Model Penal Code definition
of manslaughter, including Hawaii1 50 and New York. 151 For
PTSD defendants on trial for murder, a manslaughter statute
such as this would aid in downgrading the murder offense to
manslaughter because PTSD is argued to be an extreme mental
disturbance. However, this is unhelpful for any PTSD sufferer
not charged with murder. Manslaughter statutes aid in down-
grading offenses for PTSD sufferers, but can still result in im-
prisonment as opposed to treatment.
E. Self-Defense
Self-defense also is a viable option as a defense for PTSD
veterans. The Model Penal Code defines the defense as: "the
use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for
the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
146. Id.
147. Id. at *5.
148. See generally People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256 (1986).
149. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.3 (1962).
150. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 707-702(2) (1976).
151. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.20 (2004).
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force by such other person on the present occasion." 152 As ap-
plied to PTSD, this would apply where a defendant was in sur-
vival mode and felt it necessary to protect himself through his
actions, regardless of the reality of the situation.
The use of PTSD in this context might parallel that of the 'bat-
tered spouse syndrome' that has been used to explain a female
defendant's violent acts towards her spouse. It may be possible to
show that a particular type of provocation caused a PTSD-type
reaction in which the defendant felt attacked and responded in-
voluntarily or even reasonably given his or her experiences. 153
Thus, a PTSD veteran's behavioral and lifestyle differences
pre- and post-Iraq would be relevant in trial testimony to estab-
lish the circumstances that would provoke a defendant to de-
fend himself against his perceived threat. 54 Self-defense,
however, is only applicable in the scenario where the defendant
used force or a threat of force. 55
Self-defense is a viable defense for a PTSD veteran if the
jury believes that a person is justified in using force to protect
himself against an imaginary aggressor. While there are no
statistics on whether this defense has been successful, it seems
difficult for a jury to accept.
V. The Problem
The problem with using PTSD as a defense is not just with
the legal system. The problem is also with the current cultural
state of the nation. American society is acutely aware of
PTSD's existence and symptoms, therefore making the disorder
easily falsifiable. 56 Because of this, the court systems should
be prepared for an onslaught of PTSD defense claims posed by
Iraq war veterans.
PTSD has become a widely-publicized issue in American
culture, beginning with its declaration as an official disorder in
1980.157 Since then, it has proliferated into numerous other
syndromes including, but not limited to, Battered Child Syn-
152. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
153. Erlinder, supra note 85, at 329.
154. Id.
155. Auberry, supra note 5, at 670.
156. Slovenko, supra note 14, at 412.
157. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8.
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drome, Battered Patient Syndrome, Policeman's Syndrome,
Whiplash Syndrome, Lover's Syndrome, Low-Back Syndrome,
Love Fear Syndrome, Organic Delusional Syndrome and Holo-
caust Syndrome. 158 Because of this proliferation, PTSD has be-
come a household phrase. 159 Few subject areas have received as
much attention as PTSD in the worlds of academia and psychia-
try. 60 "It has [even] been quipped that if PTSD were listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, it would be a growth stock worth
watching."' 6' And this is just the beginning.
Furthermore, certain American tragedies and societal is-
sues have exacerbated our fascination with PTSD. September
11, 2001, not only changed our view on the world, it also
changed our psyches forever. As 9/11 was a severely traumatic
event, it can be classified as a stressor under the APA guide-
lines for PTSD. 62 The thousands who were involved in the
tragedy and the millions more who viewed or read about the
events now potentially classify as PTSD sufferers. Because of
the impact this tragedy had on most United States citizens, re-
search and fascination with PTSD has accelerated. 163 Not only
are syndromes of PTSD proliferating, so are its symptoms and
society's knowledge of its symptoms.
Because of PTSD's popularity in American culture and
academia, Iraq war veterans are going to be more familiar with
the disorder than Vietnam veterans were. Iraq veterans will
know what it means to have PTSD, they will know what causes
it and they may also know how to fake it. Iraq veterans will be
going into war knowing that PTSD can be caused by war. This
knowledge may result in increased instances of Iraq war veter-
ans falsifying PTSD.
The danger of potentially false PTSD claims is high consid-
ering that falsification is simple. 64 This is evidenced by the
case of People v. Lockett. 65 Lockett was charged with robbery
and made a plea of non-responsibility on the basis of mental
158. Slovenko, supra note 14, at 421.
159. Id. at 419.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 420.
162. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 26.
163. Slovenko, supra note 14, at 419.
164. Id. at 415.
165. People v. Lockett, 121 Misc. 2d 549 (N.Y. Crim. Term 1983).
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illness, specifically PTSD. 166 The state conceded that they could
not prove criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt be-
cause of this defense. 16 7 Several psychiatrists examined Lockett
and concluded that he had PTSD. One psychiatrist reported
that Lockett was
agitated; he 'paced back and forth, was tearful and appeared gen-
uinely anxious and depressed'. . . [and was] 'altogether pre-occu-
pied with experiences of that war which reportedly continue [d] to
plague him and which repeatedly distracted him to the point
where he could not effectively attend to the issues.' 168
Another reported that Lockett was feeling resentful and angry
because there had been no grand homecoming for him when he
returned to the United States.169 Lockett even justified his her-
oin and cocaine use as attempts to "'quell [his] nightmares."' 70
Lockett reported that the jets at LaGuardia Airport caused him
to experience flashbacks while he was living on Rikers Island17'
and that he was unable to do well at college, hold a job or stay
sober because of his PTSD symptoms. 72 He stated, "'I fought in
the jungles of Vietnam... you don't know what it is like.., you
walk through the jungles and swamps where leeches suck your
blood... I am still a soldier [t]here.""' 73 Both the state's and the
defense's psychiatrists concluded that Lockett was suffering
from PTSD.' 74
However, Lockett's criminal proceedings were interrupted
by a motion by the state to vacate the plea, arguing that it was
induced by fraud.175 Subsequent evidence revealed that Lockett
had never served in Vietnam. 76 His Air Force record stated
that Lockett "never left Randolph Air Force Base, in Texas,
where he was an accounting clerk." 77 Lockett attempted to
claim that he had been in Vietnam on a "secret" mission for a
166. Id. at 549.
167. Id. at 550.
168. Id. at 551.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 552.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 553.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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year and a half,178 but was unable to convince the court and his
plea was set aside.179
The Lockett case exemplifies how PTSD can be falsified.
Coupled with the fact that Iraq war veterans know of PTSD and
probably know it can be used as a defense, this could mean a
proliferation of PTSD defenses in the court systems. This is a
problem that needs to be addressed in order to protect the integ-
rity and credibility of both our veterans and our courts.
It can be argued that cases using a PTSD defense or cases
involving war veterans fail and deserve to fail because of the
incompetence of the attorneys working on the case. 80 However,
attorney incompetence may appear in circumstances where the
client has PTSD and the lawyer does not recognize it.181 The
veteran may either be embarrassed as to his condition or in the
dark about why he feels and acts the way he does. 8 2 It is the
attorney's duty to ask the questions and make a PTSD investi-
gation when dealing with a war veteran. 8 3 If the attorney fails
to do so, a veteran suffering from PTSD will likely be convicted
and sent to jail where the disorder will increase in severity. Re-
cidivism because of this attorney error appears almost certain
under these circumstances. Thus, an attorney must remember
to do his or her due diligence when dealing with a veteran ac-
cused of a crime.
VI. The Solution
In order to address the issues surrounding the use of PTSD
as an exculpatory device, the answer may lie in a new defense.
The current defenses, as outlined above, do not adequately re-
present the spectrum of PTSD symptoms and vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. The insanity defense under the
M'Naghten standard creates almost impossible evidentiary bur-
dens. The ALI Model Penal Code standard, which includes a
volitional component, mainly applies to those suffering from
dissociative states, as does the unconsciousness/automatism de-
178. Id. at 554.
179. Id. at 558.
180. Telephone Interview with C. Peter Erlinder, supra note 46.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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fense. The defense of diminished capacity is seldom available
and in the event that it does exist, the punishment varies as
well. Self-defense is a viable option, but it is debatable whether
it would be accepted by juries. Irresistible impulse also has via-
bility, but appears to be identical to the volitional component of
the ALI standard. When used as a mitigating factor, a PTSD
defense is successful but still often results in imprisonment
which will most likely exacerbate the condition, causing recidi-
vism. In order to remedy these shortcomings, a new defense
may be in order.
The defense would be designed specifically for PTSD in or-
der to address the full spectrum of PTSD symptoms. However,
it must also be designed to prevent falsification, which would be
done by leaving the burden of proof on the defendant to prove
PTSD by clear and convincing evidence. If the burden of proof
was raised to the highest standard (beyond a reasonable doubt),
the new defense may have the same fate as the insanity de-
fense: impossible evidentiary burdens with a low success rate.
Perhaps the burden of proof should be left at the same level as
the federal and state insanity tests but the "severe mental dis-
ease" language should be redacted. Some PTSD symptoms may
not classify as a severe mental disease, but may qualify under a
different definition; however, the burden of proving it would re-
main the same, allowing more veterans a chance at success.
The new defense must balance the interests of society in hold-
ing criminals accountable for their wrongdoing and the inter-
ests of veterans who are mentally ill.
The proposed new defense should solely deal with mental
illness, but should not require a "severe mental illness" as the
insanity defense requires. A proposed PTSD defense is as
follows:
Affirmative Defense: It is an affirmative defense to a prose-
cution that, at the time of the commission of the acts constitut-
ing the offense, the defendant, as a result of a proven extreme
trauma which caused Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as de-
fined by the American Psychiatric Association, acted in re-
sponse to what the defendant perceived as a threat of unlawful
force, in response to an involuntary compulsion, or without req-
uisite intent due to diminished mental capacity.
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Burden of Proof: Defendant has the burden of proving this
defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Result: If said defense is successful, defendant shall un-
dergo intensive PTSD treatment for a period within the discre-
tion of the court.
The defense thus encapsulates the spectrum of PTSD
symptoms by identifying the American Psychiatric Association's
definition of the disorder. The level of severity by which the
trauma must qualify will dissuade falsification, as will the high
evidentiary burden. The fact that the trauma must be proven,
encapsulates the theory that PTSD is the one disorder that can
be proven. 84 Thus, the trauma is proven and the presence of
the disorder is proven which reduces falsification.
The defense addresses the actus reus component of crimi-
nal liability in that it includes a volitional component. The de-
fense borrows from the irresistible impulse defense in that it
suggests that a "snapping" or dissociative reaction may follow,
and overreacting occurs if the person is over-stressed and
hyper-vigilant. An overreaction caused by a mental disease is
involuntary, thereby no criminal liability should attach if the
defendant could not control his own actions. This applies to all
symptoms of PTSD.
The defense also borrows from the diminished capacity.
The shortcomings of that defense are solved by prescribing an
appropriate punishment. No longer will those veterans acquit-
ted by a diminished capacity defense (where they can find it) be
let free into an unsuspecting society without treatment. Fur-
thermore, should the defense be adopted by a majority of the
states, more veterans will be able to avail themselves of the di-
minished capacity defense through the PTSD defense. This
solves the problem of the defense being typically unavailable in
most states.
The prototype also combines an element of the self-defense
option. It provides for an affirmative defense if the veteran suf-
fering from PTSD defends himself using force against what he
perceives as an impending attack. This brings in the dissocia-
tive state symptom of PTSD and avoids the higher proof burden
of the insanity defense.
184. Id.
586 [Vol. 28:561
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/4
2008] IRAQ AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL QUAGMIRE
In regards to the concern of uniformity, the states must ob-
viously choose whether to adopt the defense. However, if
adopted, it would cancel out the problems with using the other
defenses. States will hopefully see this as an opportunity to im-
prove the judicial system by weeding out any falsified PTSD
cases, reducing the prison population and addressing the needs
of mentally ill persons. As such, states may be more inclined to
adopt the defense, thereby increasing its prevalence and im-
proving upon uniformity.
Furthermore, the mandatory treatment provision of the
proposed statute decreases the possibility of recidivism and aids
the veteran. Prison would not be an available punishment,
thereby avoiding an aggravation of the condition. Also, releas-
ing an untreated mentally ill veteran back into society is
avoided by removing the possibility of complete acquittal.
While the proposed statute is not perfect, it is a step in the right
direction.
VII. Conclusion
A new defense tailored to the symptoms of PTSD may solve
the problems associated with the current defenses available to
veterans with PTSD. It would create uniformity if adopted
while encompassing the full range of PTSD symptoms. It would
also prevent falsification attempts which would promote judi-
cial integrity. The defense and the concepts implied within it
have the potential to solve the PTSD problem and aid those vet-
erans living with the debilitating symptoms of the disorder. A
new defense may not be the perfect solution, but the fact re-
mains that the court systems need to be prepared for an ava-
lanche of PTSD cases. In keeping with the message of Mr.
Felde, as the countrymen of our veterans, "we owe them at least
this much."18 5
185. State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 394 (La. 1982).
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